# Aff – PGMs 2 – BFHR

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## Case

### \*1AC---Russia Revisionist

#### Russia is revisionist – only deterrence solves.

Charalambides 6-26 [Yiannos Charalambides, doctorate and head of Ledra College’s International Relations department, 6-26-2022. “A Russian Revisionist Strategy on the Rise?”, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2022.2076303. DOA: 07-02-2022 //ArchanSen]

The better we understand why Russia intends to increase its geopolitical and geostrategic position and role in the regional arena, the better we can realize why and how the Russian revisionist policy has been developing since 2008, from Europe to the Middle East, via the Caucasus region. Since 2008: a) Russia prevented NATO’s expansionist policy through the wars in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine. Russia returned stridently to the international arena; b) Russia has consolidated its position as a leading and dominant power in the Caucasus region; c) It took action in the Middle East and defended its strategic interests in Syria.

Moscow uses all the necessary factors available to realize its revisionist strategy. Such factors are:

1. Military strength. The first level is that of a preventive strategy. The second is that of the Russian aim to consolidate its strategy either with force—as occurred in the cases of Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine—or in the shadow of its power.
2. Gas and oil. Russia uses the pipelines like ‘energy divisions’ to serve its interests and increase its political influence over states and governments.
3. Technology. Russia combined conventional and cyber techniques and tactics in the wars that it led from 2008. Its conventional military forces include sophisticated weapons such as the missile systems of S-300 and S-400 and the hypersonic missiles (3M22 Zircon) that combined with its extended cyberwar capabilities provide Russia with the chance to attenuate the advantage that the US holds in the sea due to its tremendous war fleet power. 41
4. Historical and imperial Russian consciousness.42 Moscow has an imperial identity and consciousness, military power, national resources and a pivotal geopolitical position in the core of the Heartland. By combining these factors, Moscow fuels its political machine to accomplish its strategic missions and targets.
5. Russian minorities existing in other states are used by the Kremlin as strategic instruments to achieve its national goals. This phenomenon is evident in the cases of Crimea and Ukraine. Minorities also exist in the Baltic States and other countries, which emerged in the regional system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this specific issue of minorities takes wider and more complicated dimensions. It is also relevant to political and legal motives and the right to self-determination, the exercise of which depends on conflicting and convergent national interests of the parties involved as well as the uniqueness of each case. Moreover, humanity experienced tragic implications when Adolf Hitler exploited the Sudeten Germans as a strategic instrument to occupy Czechoslovakia paving the way for the Second World War. It is not a new strategic practice. Therefore, history repeats itself because the feeling of national integration cannot be easily suppressed.

The lack of an adequate European and American preventive strategy is a quasi-ally of Russia which pursues to restructure the international system and promote its revisionist strategy. The American and European expansionist policy offered Russia the pretext to put forward a preventive and then a revisionist policy in Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine. Moscow seized the opportunity to make its case by accusing the US and NATO of following an aggressive strategy that put Russian security at stake. While Russia argues that it is in defence, at the same time, it promotes its revisionist, even belligerent strategy, which partially induces a redistribution of power and the restructuring of the regional and international system in line with its hegemonic strategic goals.43 Whether this policy will be successful and to what extent, is something that only time can show. The War on Ukraine seems to be a cornerstone for the future structural changes in Europe and worldwide. Russia pursues to raise itself as a game-changer. The relevant question is the following: What structural changes the Russo-Ukrainian War could bring about?

#### \*Russia revisionist.

Natsios 22 [Andrew S. Natsios, Former Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, 02-17-2022. “Putin’s New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?” <https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/195461/natsiosPutins%20New%20Russia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. DOA: 07-02-2022 //ArchanSen]

Putin has positioned himself and Russia as a culturally and religiously conservative alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia which is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi- official government publication that describes the political ideology of the State, the Orthodox Church’s religious vision, geographic determinism, and social analysis shared by Putin and his circle of oligarchs who rule Russia. These essays form a strange amalgam of anti-democratic, reactionary, ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government and dictatorship.18 One view of Project Russia is that its publication simply reflects Putin’s understanding as a former KGB agent that a great power must have an ideology to defeat and undermine its rivals in propaganda battles. But a more sinister and alarming view is that the five volumes are Putin’s blue print for Russia’s grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the existing international order. If this interpretation of Project Russia is correct, it suggests a greater level of future conflict with the western democracies and international institutions. If Project Russia is a blue print and not just a propaganda tool, the risk of an accidental global conflagration between Russia and the NATO alliance is a real, even if less than likely, possibility.

Vladimir Putin must find ways of explaining to the Russian people why the country is so far behind the western democracies, as did his predecessors in the Soviet Union. Putin continues to pursue the Soviet strategy of keeping the memory of World War II alive to stir up Russian nationalism among the population but also as an explanation for Russia’s underdevelopment. The evidence suggests that this strategy faces increasing hurdles. Russia’s epic and very real sacrifices during World War II no longer have much resonance with the younger generation, who know little about the war, and the older generation, who tire of a war 70 years ago being used to explain Russian inability to match Western living standards today. Thus, what had been a powerful historical experience of collective suffering and sacrifice during World War II, has now become a fading memory which lacks the magnetic power it held over the Russian people during the Cold War.19

Undoubtedly, one of the motivations behind Putin’s attempt to regain Russia’s lost stature in the world, expand its sphere of influence, attack western democratic institutions, and annex the territory of its neighbors is driven by a need to avenge the supposed “secret conspiracy” among the Western democracies to collapse of the Soviet empire and humiliate Mother Russia.20 The Russian electronic media and Project Russia continue to propagate this and other conspiracy theories. The Russian government’s arming of the Taliban, reported by U.S. intelligence sources and by CNN, may be a response to U.S. military intervention in Syria against the Assad Government, an ally of Russia, but it could also be payback for the CIA’s arming of the Mujahideen fighting against the Russian military in Afghanistan during the 1980’s.21 Some in the Reagan Administration saws the arming of the Mujahideen as U.S. payback for Soviet support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

Some of the history of the Cold War certainly involved the arming of U.S. and Russian client states against each other, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 U.S. policy changed to one of facilitating the integration of Russia into the international system and its conversion into a democratic capitalist system. Both the U.S. and Europe spent billions of aid dollars in programs in Russia from 1991 to 2012 to support these political and economic reforms. If they intended to destroy Russia, why would they have made these large investments? It is also the case that President George H.W. Bush went to great lengths to avoid dancing on the grave of the Soviet empire as it collapsed in order to avoid giving fodder to Mikhail Gorbachev’s critics.

#### \*Russia revisionist.

Malmgren 6-3 [Harald Malmgren, 6-3-2022, "Putin's war is just beginning", UnHerd, https://unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

Putin talked at length about the historic tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also added that the Soviet Bloc was the wrong model for what Russia needed. He made an impassioned explanation that what Russia really needed was a new Peter the Great. He talked almost lovingly about Peter’s attempts to upgrade Russia’s institutions and education system from 1682 to 1725. He argued that after the total collapse of the USSR, it had become necessary to rebuild a Greater Russia under the leadership of a new version of Peter.

Peter, he told me, had set in motion the magnificent strengthening of Russia completed by Catherine the Great: the establishment of Novorossiya, or Imperial Russia, spanning all of the Baltic Sea, the Nordics and Poland, as well as the peoples and nations to the west and to the south to the Azov and Black Sea. He then made it clear he did not think the Soviet Bloc was the right model to achieve this, and what he longed for was a return of Imperial Russia, not Soviet Russia.

Reflecting on this early interaction with this clearly ambitious young man, I was reminded of Putin’s path from being Deputy Mayor of St Petersburg to serving under President Yeltsin in Moscow. In 1996 Yeltsin asked the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Professor Sobchak, to come to Moscow and lead the drafting of a new Constitution for the new Republic of Russia. Sobchak asked his protégé, Putin, to come along.

In Moscow, Yevgeny Primakov, Yeltsin’s Prime Minister, had been known for years as “the Soviet Union’s Kissinger”. I had known him since the Eighties. It was he who first introduced me to Putin in 1992 as a man likely to be important in Russia’s future. Primakov initially appointed Putin as head of the FSB, but soon after asked him to take on the more comprehensive role of Secretary of the State Security Council, effectively placing him in charge of shaping the new Russian Republic’s foreign policy. It was said at the time that Primakov’s proposal filled Putin with a noticeable ecstasy, that fate had gifted him with the opportunity to live his dream of reshaping Russian history.

Never one to shy away from an opportunity, Putin immersed himself in every aspect of Russia’s standing in the world. He did, however, pay particular attention to the potential for nuclear weapons to intimidate other nations. He published a new doctrine of nuclear threats, known as “Escalate to Deescalate”. The public airing of this doctrine was meant to show that he was seriously considering selective use of nuclear weapons not only inside Ukraine but in future conflicts with Baltic Sea neighbours.

By 1999, the time had come for Yeltsin to step down. A new constitution had been approved, and Russia was ready for a new leader. Several candidates appeared, but Sobchak, father of the constitution, and Putin, the man designated to deal with foreign leaders, emerged as favourites. I recently asked people who were there at the time how the competition was resolved, and was told Sobchak made the choice. He said he was an academic, but not a man who would be good at managing a nation. He admitted he thought “Vlad” was a man of action, just what Russia needed at that moment. So Putin was appointed Prime Minister, and four months later elected President.

This elevation was extraordinary. To Putin, who dreamed of a return to Imperial Russia, it must have felt like fate had chosen him to be a second incarnation of Peter the Great — a 21st-century Tsar, or even Emperor. This self-perception may well have led him to embrace Xi Jinping, the other self-perceived 21st-century Emperor.

### 1AC---New Baltics Cards

#### Baltics invasion is coming within the year – Russia views it as an easy dub.

Grady 6-16 [John Grady, editor of Navy Times, retired director of communications for the United States Army, 6-16-2022, "Baltic States Need More NATO Forces to Deter a Russian Invasion, Says Estonian Official", USNI News, https://news.usni.org/2022/06/16/baltic-states-need-more-nato-forces-to-deter-a-russian-invasion-says-estonian-official, DOA: 6-30-2022 //ArchanSen]

Despite the Kremlin’s heavy losses in invading Ukraine, the Russians are “going to come back stronger” in a year or so to threaten the Baltics, Estonian Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary said on Thursday.

Speaking at a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment event, Kusti Salm said that even given Moscow’s rising number of casualties, destruction of armored forces and depletion of precision-guided weapons, the Kremlin can still mass fires as it is showing in fighting in eastern and southern Ukraine.

He called NATO’s “trip-wire” strategy and even its “forward presence” in limited numbers obsolete in light of Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

Because the Baltic nations are on Russian borders and small, they could be quickly overwhelmed in a full-scale Russian invasion.

“Deterrence by denial,” Salm said Wednesday, cannot be achieved by a battalion of NATO troops in his country or any other Baltic member of the alliance. He called it “a joke” that “the second largest nuclear nation would be deterred by a battalion.” The presence “has to be at the divisional level” to “be able to project power across the Russian border.”

#### Squo ammunitions aren’t enough.

Emmott 6-15 [Robin Emmott, 6-15-2022, "The Baltic states want more NATO. They won't get all they seek", Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-want-more-nato-they-wont-get-all-they-seek-2022-06-15/, DOA: 6-30-2022 //ArchanSen]

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid.

It will not happen, interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show.

This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, and tackling new frontiers in space.

Since Russia invaded, the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters, as well as attack helicopters, to Estonia; Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1,700 personnel.

But for many people in the region, which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg, that is not enough. For instance, 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were highly anxious about Russia's invasion.

"The fact that we could be in danger, it's been on the table all the time," said Dzintra Bungs, 82, head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. "It is very important that we have woken up, and that all Europe awakes."

The Baltics, with a combined population of just over six million, want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5,000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold, as well as adding air and maritime defences.

### 1AC---Ukraine

#### The tide has turned – Russia is going to win the war.

Davis 6-22 [Daniel Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army, 6-22-2022, "Russia May Win the War in Ukraine", 19FortyFive, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/06/russia-may-win-the-war-in-ukraine/, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]

On Sunday, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said “nobody knows” how long the Russian war in Ukraine might last, but, he added, “we need to be prepared for it to last years.” Retired Army General Jack Keane told a Fox & Friends audience on Monday that Ukraine had the ability, will, and troops to win the war. All they lacked, he claimed, “is the weapons to do it.”

The historical record and a growing mountain of evidence, however, suggest that such claims are unrealistically optimistic, as there is a growing possibility that the Ukrainian Army may be months away from losing the ability to defend the country.

If the two sides do not end the war through negotiations in the coming months, it is likely – not just possible – that Ukraine will lose the war.

It is time to strip off the rose-colored glasses much of the West has worn when looking at Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and acknowledge the cold, hard truth: the Russians are on course to win. The longer we traffic in the fiction that Ukraine still has a chance, the more Ukrainian civilians will be killed, the more cities will be destroyed, and the higher the probability that Russia seizes yet more territory before a negotiated settlement can end the fighting – potentially including Kyiv. You’d never know that, however, listening to high-ranking current and former officials in the West.

#### PMGs are key to get the upper hand.

Magnuson 6-15 [Stew Magnuson, 6-15-2022, "", No Publication, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

Ukraine has a message it wants to convey to the U.S. defense industrial base and the government.

The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds, but what can truly give it the upper hand over its Russian invaders are long-range precision weapons such as armed Predator drones, loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system.

Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, support for weapons and equipment, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander, spoke with National Defense Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson and other reporters through an interpreter in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense’s booth at the Eurosatory conference in Paris on June 15.

#### PGM sales on June 29th prove their effectiveness, thump every DA, but don’t solve the aff.

Schmitt and Ismay 7-1 [Eric Schmitt is a senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times. John Ismay is a Pentagon correspondent in the Washington bureau, and previously served as the At War reporter covering armed conflict for The New York Times Magazine. 7-1-2022, "Advanced U.S. Arms Make a Mark in Ukraine War, Officials Say", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/01/us/politics/himars-weapons-ukraine.html, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

The most advanced weapons that the United States has so far supplied Ukraine are making an impact in their first several days on the battlefield, destroying Russian ammunition depots and command centers, American and Ukrainian officials say.

Ukraine’s military had eagerly awaited the arrival of the first batch of truck-mounted, multiple-rocket launchers, whose satellite-guided rockets have a range of more than 40 miles, greater than anything Ukraine had possessed. The weapons have even won grudging respect from some Russians for their accuracy and power, analysts said.

Still, only four of the launchers, called High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems or HIMARS, and their U.S.-trained crews are in the fight, though four more are expected this month. Ukrainian officials say they need as many as 300 multiple-rocket launchers to combat Russia, which is firing several times as many rounds as Ukraine’s forces in the artillery-driven war of attrition in the country’s east.

Ukrainian soldiers are using their new weapon judiciously, firing one or two guided rockets at ammunition depots or command posts, often at night, and keeping them well away from the front lines to protect them, Pentagon officials and military analysts say.

“So far they seem to be a quite useful addition,” Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and a former U.S. Marine officer, said of the systems. “They will help hinder further Russian advances, but they won’t necessarily mean Ukraine will be able to take back territory.”

The HIMARS are the centerpiece of a raft of new Western long-range weapons that the outgunned Ukrainian military is switching over to as its arsenal of Soviet-era howitzer and rocket ammunition dwindles.

The Western weapons are more accurate and highly mobile, but it takes weeks to deploy them from the United States and Europe and to train soldiers to use them. In the meantime, Russia’s military is making slow but methodical gains in the eastern region of Donbas, where both sides have taken heavy losses.

The Biden administration says that all eight HIMARS should be in Ukraine by mid-July. The first group of 60 Ukrainian soldiers trained to use them are now firing the guided rockets in battle, and a second group is undergoing training in Germany. Britain and Germany have each pledged three similar multiple-rocket launchers.

A senior Pentagon official said this week that the Ukrainians appear to be employing the HIMARS with deadly effectiveness and that the four additional systems would be deployed in “the near future.”

At a NATO summit in Madrid on Thursday, President Biden promised $800 million more in security assistance to Ukraine, including more ammunition for the HIMARS. The United States has committed nearly $7 billion in military aid since the war started in February.

Since Russia focused its campaign on the east after failing to seize Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and other cities in the north, Ukrainian officials have pleaded with United States and other allies for more advanced artillery.

On June 23, Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, announced that the first American HIMARS had arrived, promising in a Twitter message, “Summer will be hot for russian occupiers. And the last one for some of them.”

Two days later, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the top commander of Ukrainian forces, posted a video on the social media site Telegram of the HIMARS in use. “Artillerymen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine skillfully hit certain targets — the enemyʼs military facilities on our Ukrainian territory,” he said.

American officials said the Ukrainian statements were accurate, and Mr. Lee added that even Russian accounts acknowledged the HIMARS to be early successes.

“In general, it seems they respect them and realize they’re quite capable,” said Mr. Lee, citing a popular Russian Telegram channel whose posts are shared by Russian defense accounts.

#### They are key.

Magnuson 6-15 [Stew Magnuson, 6-15-2022, "", No Publication, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen] \*Brackets were in original text

Sharapov: The party that will win in this war will be the party that will first start using contemporary high precision equipment and weapon systems. And those drones that you mentioned, they are a part of the modernized, highly accurate, highly precise, modern equipment. It gives us an advantage that allows us to accurately strike the enemy.

Gen. Karpenko: Regarding the first question, I want to add something to what the deputy minister has said in terms of the need for equipment and armaments. I just want you to understand the intensity of the conflict. While the deputy minister was talking, I drafted some numbers to just show you the intensity of combat along those … kilometers where the combat is most active.

Think about this: one brigade occupies around 40 kilometers of the fence line. That means that to cover the active combat conflict we need 40 brigades. Every brigade is 100 infantry fighting vehicles, 30 tanks, 54 artillery systems — just for one brigade, and we have 40 of them.

I'm not going to talk about the anti-tank guided missiles or anti-tank guided weapons for now. I’m just talking about heavy weapons. As of today, we have approximately 30 to 40, sometimes up to 50 percent of losses of equipment as a result of active combat. So, we have lost approximately 50 percent. … Approximately 1,300 infantry fighting vehicles have been lost, 400 tanks, 700 artillery systems.

That is a mathematical estimation we can make based on the length of the frontline and the intensity of the conflict. So, I'm giving you this estimate just for you to understand how significant the requirement is based on the intensity of the conflict.

So, think about it. If the current need for artillery systems is 700 vehicles, that needs to be replenished because they were destroyed. And we have only received 100 vehicles for example from [foreign] aid. … Then there [are] medical needs, the air force troops, the special forces and all the other branches and services that are also fighting in this war.

Regarding the heavy armaments and in regard to the drones as you asked about: this is what the war has come down to — using heavy artillery systems. It's close-contact warfare. So that leads to a lot of casualties.

The war that we are seeing in Ukraine right now happened the last time in 1945 when the world won over evil.

Unfortunately, today, we don't have the technologies that would allow us to limit human casualties. We have close human contact within the warfare. And that's why the deputy minister said correctly that the victorious side will be the party that has those [long-range, precision] technologies.

### 2AC---Ukraine---UQ

#### PGMs are successful, but Ukraine needs more.

NB 7-2 [News Beezer, 7-2-2022, "Modern American weapons characterize the war in Ukraine", No Publication, https://newsbeezer.com/vietnameng/modern-american-weapons-characterize-the-war-in-ukraine/, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

The Ukrainian military is eagerly awaiting the first shipment of satellite-guided missile launchers with a range of more than 40 miles, far exceeding the missile launchers previously owned by Ukraine.

Analysts say even some on the Russian side are reluctant to acknowledge the accuracy and power of these weapons.

However, only four US-made Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (HIMARS) and US-trained personnel are currently taking part in the war in Ukraine, and four more are scheduled to be delivered this month.

Ukrainian officials say they need up to 300 such systems to counter Russia in the east.

Some Pentagon officials and military analysts say Ukrainian soldiers are using the new weapons cautiously, only firing a missile or two at Russia’s ammunition depot or command post. They often launched at night and from far from the front lines to protect these valuable weapons.

“They are helping to stop Russia’s advance, but that doesn’t necessarily mean Ukraine will be able to regain territory,” said Rob Lee, an expert at the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies (USA).

### 1AC---Ukraine---Impact

#### Unless stopped with a quick, crushing defeat, Putin will escalate.

Hurd 6-6 [Dale Hurd, 6-6-2022, "Russian Officials Openly Discuss Using Nukes", CBN News, https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2022/june/russian-officials-openly-discuss-using-nukes-nobody-is-going-to-refuse-putins-orders, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

Rebekah Koffler, born in the Soviet Union and a former intelligence officer for the US government, is the author of Putin's Playbook. She says Putin would "absolutely" use a nuclear weapon.

"This type of conflict is exactly the type of situation for which Putin, on his orders, the so-called nuclear warfare doctrine was developed that is called 'escalate to de-escalate,'" Koffler said. "You are escalating by popping a nuke in a conventional conflict, in order to de-escalate the conflict. A tactical nuclear warhead could be detonated on the territory, in this case of Ukraine, in order to dislodge the opponent psychologically. If Russian intelligence services assess accurately or by mistake that the U.S. and NATO are about to intervene, Putin would preemptively activate that doctrine."

Koffler says Putin believes he has the upper hand because of his large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, which usually are small nukes intended to destroy battlefield targets rather than whole regions.

"Russia holds the advantage in tactical nukes, a one to 10 ratio," Koffler said. "We have 200, the Russians have 2,000. So this is exactly why he's prepared to use that instrument if he has to."

Some have speculated that if Putin orders a nuclear strike, his staff might disobey his order, triggering a coup. Koffler says that won't happen.

"This is such Western and American-style thinking. Nobody is going to refuse Putin's orders. Remember, we're talking about the person (Putin) who has authorized multiple assassinations," Koffler said.

#### A Russian nuke would make escalation inevitable – regardless of what NATO does.

Slocombe 22 [Walter Becker Slocombe is a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and was the Senior Advisor for Security and Defense to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad., 5-10-2022, "Will Putin use nuclear weapons in Ukraine? Our experts answer three burning questions.", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-our-experts-answer-three-burning-questions/, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

Assuming the United States, NATO, and Ukraine could agree on any action, there are several possibilities. If the Russian attack caused little damage, NATO might first try to issue an ultimatum with the aim of reaching a settlement on the Alliance’s and Ukraine’s terms. But if Putin had convinced himself that there was no other option but to strike, he would be unlikely to acquiesce to any allied proposals for such a settlement. Similarly, a non-nuclear military response (for example, conventional strikes on military bases and infrastructure in Russian territory that are supporting the invasion) would probably not be decisive and would appear inadequate to many—in addition to carrying its own risks of escalation.

That leaves the option, for which NATO forces are fully adequate, of a strike tailored to the scale and character of the Russian one. Some would understandably argue that continuing to defend Ukraine is simply not worth risking a nuclear escalation. But while it is easy to see the risks of a nuclear counterstrike, there are also serious implications of not doing it: The absence of a US nuclear response would gravely weaken the credibility among both friends and adversaries of the entire strategy of deterring nuclear attack through the prospect of US nuclear retaliation. This, in turn, would make a bigger war more likely. May we never need to face the choice.

#### Nuke war causes extinction.

Solomon 7-3 [Norman Solomon is co-founder and national director of [RootsAction](http://www.rootsaction.org/), 7-3-2022, "Nuclear War Could Mean Human Extinction. Biden and Congress Should Stop Messing Around.", Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/nuclear-war-could-mean-annihilation-but-biden-and-congress-are-messing-around/, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

President Joe Biden and top subordinates have refused to publicly acknowledge the danger of nuclear war — even though it is now higher than at any other time in at least 60 years. Their silence is insidious and powerful, and their policy of denial makes grassroots activism all the more vital for human survival.

In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy was more candid. Speaking at American University, he said: “A single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War.” Kennedy also noted, “The deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.” Finally, he added, “All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.”

Kennedy was no dove. He affirmed willingness to use nuclear weapons. But his speech offered some essential honesty about nuclear war — and the need to seriously negotiate with the Kremlin in the interests of averting planetary incineration — an approach sorely lacking from the United States government today.

At the time of Kennedy’s presidency, nuclear war would have been indescribably catastrophic. Now — with large arsenals of hydrogen bombs and what scientists know about “nuclear winter” — experts have concluded that a nuclear war would virtually end agriculture and amount to omnicide (the destruction of human life on earth).

### 1AC---Ukraine---Thumpers

#### There’s been a couple instances of SC with Ukraine – I’ll insert a list.

DoS 6-23 [United States Department of State, 6-23-2022, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine", https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems;

Over 6,500 Javelin anti-armor systems;

Over 20,000 other anti-armor systems;

Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;

108 155mm Howitzers and over 220,000 155mm artillery rounds;

90 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers;

15 Tactical Vehicles to recover equipment;

High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and ammunition;

20 Mi-17 helicopters;

Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;

200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;

Over 7,000 small arms;

Over 50,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;

75,000 sets of body armor and helmets;

121 Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;

Laser-guided rocket systems;

Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems;

Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;

22 counter-artillery radars;

Four counter-mortar radars;

Four air surveillance radars;

M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions;

C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing;

Tactical secure communications systems;

Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders;

Commercial satellite imagery services;

Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear;

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;

Medical supplies to include first aid kits;

Electronic jamming equipment;

Field equipment and spare parts.

### 1AC---Turkey Alliance Good

#### Turkey is good for NATO – shields NATO, prevents anti-Islam bias, decreases RCA, terror, NATO military capability, influence.

THO nd [THO Contributors, xx-xx-xxxx, "Turkey’s NATO membership is an asset for both Turkey and the Alliance", Turkey’s NATO membership is an asset for both Turkey and the Alliance, https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/analysis-by-tho-contributors-and-liaisons/turkeys-nato-membership-is-an-asset-for-both-turkey-and-the-alliance-9620, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general and the United States in particular also benefit from Turkey's membership. First, since its entry to the alliance Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south. Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating the Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia and wider Middle East. During the Cold War Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen the Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up sizable Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted.

Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO which has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations. This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics. For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence inside the alliance has been vitally important.

Third, if the Biden administration is sincere about revitalizing the rules-based international order and committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkey’s cooperation within NATO would be decisive. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis.

Fourth, as NATO's current Secretary General has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East. Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would like to otherwise go to European countries. Fifth, having the second largest army within the alliance and participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities. Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan and taking command of it numerous times speak volumes in this regard. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process. Sixth, Turkey's membership in NATO provides western countries with important opportunities to have an influence on Turkey's international and internal policies/orientation as well. Why to lose this prerogative by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance?

### 2AC---A2: Humiliation Turn

#### Crushing Russia is good – the squo is the worst of all worlds – future Russian attacks, China invades Taiwan, collapse of the LIO, and middle power attacks.

Mongrenier 6-10 [Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, Professor of History and Geography and researcher at the French Institute of Geopolitics, 6-10-2022, "Why do we Want Ukraine to Win?", Desk & Russie, https://en.desk-russie.eu/2022/06/10/why-do-we-want-ukraine-to-win.html, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

The political-media system is prone to cyclothymia. After having feared the collapse of Ukraine in the days following the Russian offensive of February 24, the resistance and the affirmation of a “nation in arms” gave rise to the greatest optimism. The question now was how far to support the Ukrainian counter-offensive. Shouldn’t Vladimir Putin’s Russia be spared “humiliation” by offering it a “way out”? Even if it means rewarding the aggressor, humiliating the aggressed and sanctifying ethnic cleansing with bombs?

It is first of all a question of principle and of the prevalence of the general norms of law: the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of a national state fully recognized on the international scene and a member of the UN since its foundation! An independent state since the dissolution of the USSR, a decision not imposed by the West but desired by the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian presidents at the time. The Ukrainian borders were recognized by Russia itself. Let us recall the signing of the Budapest Memorandum (1994) and the Russian-Ukrainian friendship treaty (1997). On a general level, the Helsinki Final Act (1975) excludes the modification of borders by force, a principle taken up in the Charter of Paris (1990), which marked the end of the Cold War.

Turning a blind eye to such a violation of the law, in the name of “pragmatism”, i.e. of a cynical attitude, would stimulate the geopolitical revisionism and historical revanchism of the master of the Kremlin and the Chekist structure that serves him. After a strategic pause, necessary to digest its territorial gains, reconstitute its forces and play in the interstices of the Western front, Russia, driven by the cult of power (derjavnost), would set out again to attack the borders of Europe. In the meantime, an intensified “hybrid war” would have tested the resistance in Northern Europe, on the borders of the Baltic States and Poland as well as in the Black Sea basin.

It is necessary to underline here the youth and fragility of the geopolitical structure of Europe, an “old continent” whose borders date back only to the 20th century. It would be easy for one or the other state to write a historical dissertation and to exhibit maps of the past to justify claims and coups de force. In short, the running gag about Francis Fukuyama, less read than quoted, the disillusioned talk about the revenge of History and the resignation in front of the fait accompli would announce the return to the happy warmongering and without borders of other times.

The end of peace in Europe and the collapse of the international order which, for all that, contained the aggressiveness of the revisionist powers, would have repercussions on a global scale. As an ally and supporter of Russia-Eurasia, the Chinese Communist Party-State and its “little helmsman”, Xi Jinping, would be encouraged in their enterprise to destroy Western hegemony. The pressure on the Taiwan Strait, the islands and archipelagos of the “Asian Mediterranean” (South and East China Seas) would be accentuated. Not to mention the Himalayan borders of the Indian Union. In the wake of Sino-Russian Eurasia, small and medium-sized “troublemakers” would be tempted.

For all these reasons, the West must show moral clarity, unity of purpose and resolve in its support for Ukraine. Notwithstanding game theory and clever developments on the gradation of retaliation, interspersed with appeals for peace, it must be understood that Putin wants to take Ukraine, no longer at once but in tranches, and that he will destroy what he cannot conquer. His armies and his police machine will advance until they are stopped. He himself sees himself at war with the “collective West”, which brings us back to the great political lesson of Julien Freund: “It is not I who designate the enemy, it is he who designates me as such”. It is as simple as that.

So there is no real and honorable alternative to the victory of Ukraine. One can already hear the false metaphysical questions about the meaning of such a term: what is victory in the 21st century? Is not the war dead? Doesn’t everything just flow? On the pretext that nothing is eternal here below, the sophists dismiss the being and withdraw into the domain of representations. Let us simply refer to the definition that the Larousse gives of victory: “Favourable outcome of a battle, of a war”. “Opposites: debacle – rout – discomfiture – rout”. More or less, this corresponds to what strategists call the “desired end state”, assuming that one does not seek defeat.

The question remains as to the terms of a Ukrainian victory in the present war. The outcome of the battle of Kiev has already prevented the worst: the collapse of the Ukrainian state. The battle of Kharkiv has shown the ability to conduct local counter-offensives. In the Don River basin, resisting the bombardments and stopping the advance of Russian units on the ground would be other successes. Further deliveries of Western weapons will contribute to this (see the forthcoming delivery of US multiple rocket launchers).

The situation in the Don River Basin cannot overshadow that in southern Ukraine. Of course, the front line is hardly moving and Mykolaiv has not fallen. Nevertheless, the territories conquered to the north of the Crimean peninsula are important, and Ukraine is deprived of part of its coastline. As for the port of Odessa, it is the object of a naval blockade which asphyxiates Ukraine and paralyses all movement in the Black Sea, at the risk of the world food balance.

In this part of the territory, the most important thing is to free Odessa, a port without which Ukraine would become a geographically landlocked state, deprived of access to the “greater Mediterranean” (including the Black Sea) and thus to the World Ocean. As things stand and for fear of a rise to extremes, a naval operation by NATO or a Western coalition to force the blockade seems hardly conceivable.

Failing that, the possibility of an international fleet under the UN flag, with a mandate voted by the UN General Assembly, is being considered. From a diplomatic point of view, such a project could allow a certain number of emerging and non-aligned countries, which have cautiously stayed away from votes condemning the Russian action, to “come on board”. From an operational point of view, one has to have doubts: is the Russian will to power inhibited by the colors of the UN? Come on!

Another response would be to deploy coastal batteries and long-range anti-ship missiles on the Ukrainian coast and along the Black Sea coast, in order to keep Russian ships at bay. Grain ships could evacuate grain from the port of Odessa to the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean Sea. Let us not forget, however, that Russia has very long-range strike capabilities.

Let’s summarize. To hold on to the Don River basin, the geohistorical border of Europe since Antiquity, and to preserve the opening of Ukraine to the Black Sea; to maintain the existing Western diplomatic front on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Donbass and Crimea: these are the terms of a Ukrainian victory, keeping in mind that this war is part of a much larger conflict.

It is in this perspective that Ukraine should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic bodies: the European Union and NATO. In fact, simple membership in the former, a commonwealth rather than a commonwill, would not be enough in terms of defense and security. If this were the case, would Finland and Sweden be knocking on NATO’s door? The comparative advantage of NATO is explained by the hegemonic leadership of the United States and the means it mobilizes for the defense of Europe.

Those who clumsily refer to the “peace camp” (a sad reminder of Soviet propaganda) will object that we have to live with Russia, which implies that we must give priority to diplomacy. Sophism. Putin is not a “man-of-effect” who would be satisfied with reacting to “man-causes” (the West): he wants to conquer territories formerly under Russian-Soviet domination and claims to assert his domination over Europe. “Concessions” and “compromises” will encourage him to move forward. In reality, diplomacy is governed by the balance of power on the ground.

In short, submissive behavior will not save us from danger. It is important to understand that the Russian threat to Europe cannot be explained by a misunderstanding, regrettable blunders or a technical-institutional problem. This threat is structural — it is a geopolitical fact that the policy of appeasement of the last fifteen years has not been able to modify — and it must be countered.

Peace by force, therefore, in the order of the flesh, not evangelical peace and the eschatology of the last ends, which are of a different order. To realize this and to change our mental maps accordingly would be a great victory. It would mean breaking out of the impolitic behavior that Western governments have been indulging in for too long.

#### Russia won’t lash out against America – he knows he’ll lose.

Sanger et al 22 [David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes, 3-23-2022, "U.S. Makes Contingency Plans in Case Russia Uses Its Most Powerful Weapons", No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/us/politics/biden-russia-nuclear-weapons.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

If Mr. Putin did strike a NATO country intentionally, he would not only bring the force of the military alliance to bear on Russia, but also probably find himself facing NATO troops inside Ukraine, Artis Pabriks, Latvia’s defense minister, told reporters traveling in his country this month with Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“He will get Article 5,” Mr. Pabriks said, in a reference to the NATO pledge that an attack on one alliance member is an attack on all.

“If he gets that, basically that would also make us involved in Ukraine,” Mr. Pabriks said, adding: “He has no way out of that. So I don’t think he should be so stupid.”

#### Nuclear deterrence theory – Putin will only lose a nuke if he barely wins – a crush means he’ll be deterred.

Geist 22 [Edward Geist, policy researcher with a PhD in history, 03-8-2022, "Is Putin Irrational? What Nuclear Strategic Theory Says About Deterrence of Potentially Irrational Opponents", No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/is-putin-irrational-what-nuclear-strategic-theory-says.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

As nuclear strategists recognized decades ago, deterrence is necessary—but it isn't always sufficient. The analysts and theorists who worked on these issues were bedeviled, in particular, by the problem of nonrational opponents. As the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn put it in 1962, “We want to deter even the mad.”

Kahn took comfort in his conclusion that “irrationality is a matter of degree,” so scaling up nuclear deterrence might still impress a “need for caution” upon irrational adversaries. Furthermore, “if the irrationality is sufficiently bizarre, the irrational decisionmaker's subordinates are likely to step in.”

Theorist Patrick Morgan preferred the term “sensible” over “rational” to make it clear that an adversary doesn't have to be perfectly rational to be understood and his actions anticipated. Sensible actors may have goals that are anathema to our own, but they pursue them in ways that appear likely to attain those objectives. They also may commit human errors. But even Morgan acknowledged that not every opponent will be “sensible” enough to respect a deterrent threat.

### 2AC---A2: NATO Withdraw

#### NATO prevents existential risks – solves terror and both Russia and China.

Røseth and Weaver 6-27 [Tom Røseth is an associate professor and head of the Ukraine Program, Oslo, Norway at the Norwegian Defense College. John Weaver is an associate professor of intelligence analysis at York College of Pennsylvania. 6-27-2022, "Questioning NATO relevance is misguided and dangerous", Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3538664-questioning-nato-relevance-is-misguided-and-dangerous/, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

This week, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the longest enduring alliance in history, will gather in Madrid for their annual summit. Yet, despite its longevity and success — or perhaps because of it — many people question NATO’s relevance today, even as Russia occupies 20 percent of Ukraine and threatens other European states. Others have called for the U.S. to withdraw from NATO, preferring an isolationist approach to global conflicts. These attitudes are misguided and dangerous. NATO is not only still relevant to the United States and the other members, it’s necessary, and here is why.

NATO came to the aid of the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Many Americans fail to realize that NATO invoked Article 5 (an attack on one is akin to an attack on all) and provided airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) to help assist in monitoring aerial activity over the United States. This support helped protect the U.S. against a possible second wave of attacks. This was the first and only time Article 5 was enacted and built upon alliance activity in which the United States and other NATO members were involved during the 1990s and included the likes of peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and North Macedonia.

NATO has also been and remains a key pillar in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with its support of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. As we have seen transnational terror organizations become even more violent and extreme, ISIS has presented a significant challenge to Europe and the United States with attacks in Belgium, Germany, France and the United States to name a few. As of just two months ago, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underscored the alliance’s provision of AWACS to monitor ISIS activity.

Fast forward to today: NATO countries, with their contribution of weapons and training to Ukrainian forces, and their solidarity in standing up to Russia have been a testament to the resolve of NATO and further underpins its importance. Moscow failed to anticipate the strong and coordinated NATO response. Educating Ukrainian military personnel on NATO standards has made a difference on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia through its aggressive behavior has made NATO reinvent its purpose, to deter Russia from expanding. NATO has provided command and control of enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in Eastern Europe as of late to hedge against Russian aggression. NATO has learned from its time in Afghanistan regarding effective communications, interoperability and building on its combat experience there.

Accordingly, there are four multinational battle groups stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland; France has also contributed troops to Romania. Russia has been employing hybrid warfare in Ukraine and has through the Feb. 24 invasion forced its return to the world stage as a significant power. Moscow punches above its weight class with its small economic size comparable to Spain, relying more on its nuclear forces while seeing its military conventional strength weakening in Ukraine. NATO’s presence in the Baltics and Poland sends a clear signal that it will not tolerate aggression against alliance members. These forces are also provided by European states, thus spreading the burden of security beyond the United States.

Given the shifting geopolitical landscape, NATO allies would be better served by using the summit as a means to strengthen their purpose, rather than pulling back. Allowing Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, unanimously confirming support of Ukraine, and perhaps most important for the United States, embracing NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which will include security issues stemming from China, would send a strong message to other would-be aggressors, that NATO is alive and well.

### 1AC---Arms K2 DIB

#### Economies of scale---contracts build resiliency into defense industry supply chains AND reduce domestic production costs, that’s Key to readiness

Eugene Gholz, 2019 Associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, and he was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13\_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf

CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense manufacturing. Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete. DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original manufacture of the defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases, demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to maintain quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the government does not realize how much the cost of production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the part profitably, so production drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These situations create potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage (DMSMS) problems.20 Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares production by keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills, and ameliorating the risk of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain. These effects have been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, among others. Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime contractors. Finally, CATs can contribute economic benefits to the United States through the economies of scale that are often available in defense systems production. If foreign sales are figured into the cost estimates from the start of a project, and foreign buyers contribute to development and capital investment spending, the cost of a project to the US defense budget will be proportionately reduced, benefiting US economic security. For example, the F-35 program claims to have benefited from this dynamic, although the higher overhead cost of managing a multinational development program and the redundancies of building extra final assembly and sustainment facilities overseas cut against the economies of scale benefits.21 In some European multinational aircraft development programs, governments have presumed that programs would gain very large benefits from economies of scale that have not materialized. This is due to technical and management challenges in the programs or the countries’ failure to follow through on their initial purchase commitments. The result in those cases was that including projected economy of scale benefits of foreign sales in a program’s management baseline added to rather than reduced program instability and hurt economic security.22 Estimating the net economic effect of expected economies of scale as part of a CAT decision would require sophisticated, reliable understanding of program dynamics that might be beyond what the US government should reasonably count on in its decision making. Overall, the new economic assessment in the CAT policy could meaningfully consider two separate types of economic benefits that might derive from arms sales: first, macroeconomic effects, especially via effects on employment, and second, microeconomic effects on specific firms and products, such as funding for component upgrades and prevention of DMSMS challenges. The methods for assessing these two types of effects would likely differ, and each would present its own challenges to the data collection and analysis process.

### 1AC---Lockheed Scenario

\*\*Note – all of this is stolen from the arms sales topic – it’s a reverse funding DA – probably not the best tbh

#### Lockheed is down.

Zacks 6-29 [Zacks Equity, 6-29-2022, "Lockheed Martin (LMT) Dips More Than Broader Markets: What You Should Know", No Publication, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/lockheed-martin-lmt-dips-more-214509816.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

Lockheed Martin (LMT) closed the most recent trading day at $418.89, moving -0.43% from the previous trading session. This change lagged the S&P 500's 0.07% loss on the day. At the same time, the Dow added 0.27%, and the tech-heavy Nasdaq gained 0.02%.

Coming into today, shares of the aerospace and defense company had lost 4.41% in the past month. In that same time, the Aerospace sector lost 3.69%, while the S&P 500 lost 7.99%.

Investors will be hoping for strength from Lockheed Martin as it approaches its next earnings release. On that day, Lockheed Martin is projected to report earnings of $6.41 per share, which would represent a year-over-year decline of 10.1%. Our most recent consensus estimate is calling for quarterly revenue of $16.25 billion, down 4.6% from the year-ago period.

LMT's full-year Zacks Consensus Estimates are calling for earnings of $26.84 per share and revenue of $66.15 billion. These results would represent year-over-year changes of +18.6% and -1.33%, respectively.

It is also important to note the recent changes to analyst estimates for Lockheed Martin. Recent revisions tend to reflect the latest near-term business trends. As such, positive estimate revisions reflect analyst optimism about the company's business and profitability.

#### PGMs boost Lockheed.

M&MR 6-28 [Markets and markets Research, 6-28-2022, "Precision Guided Munition Market Projected to Reach $41.0 billion by 2026", No Publication, https://www.yahoo.com/now/precision-guided-munition-market-projected-133000314.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

According to MarketsandMarkets™ research report, the "Precision Guided Munition Market by Speed (Subsonic, Supersonic, and Hypersonic), Product, Technology, Mode of Operation (Semi-autonomous and Autonomous), Launch Platform (Land, Airborne and Naval) and Region - Forecast to 2026", is projected to grow from USD 32.8 billion in 2021 to USD 41.0 billion by 2026, at a CAGR of 4.5% from 2021 to 2026. The growing demand for surveillance activities along the attack-prone borders, rising defense spending of emerging economy, increasing incidences of terror attacks and rising number of ongoing inter-country conflicts have led to the growth of Precision guided munitions market.

The precision guided munition market includes major players

Lockheed Martin Corporation (US),

Boeing Company (US),

Raytheon Technologies Corporation (US),

Northrop Grumman Corporation (US), and

BAE (UK).

These players have spread their business across various countries includes North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, and Rest of the World. COVID-19 has impacted their businesses as well. Industry experts believe that COVID-19 has affected smart munitions production and services globally in 2020.

#### Lockheed’s growth is key to hypersonics.

Whiteman 18 – Lou Whiteman, financial reporter, citing official government reports. [Is Lockheed Martin Winning the Hypersonic Race? 8-18-2018, https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/08/18/is-lockheed-martin-winning-the-hypersonic-race.aspx]//BPS

Hypersonic technology -- weapons and interceptors able to travel at least five times the speed of sound -- are a top Pentagon priority and an area where China and Russia are perceived to be ahead of U.S. military efforts. The Defense Department has committed to spend aggressively to catch up. Based on initial contract awards, it's becoming clear that Lockheed Martin (NYSE:LMT) is outpacing the competition in the battle to win the lion's share of those awards. Lockheed Martin earlier this month was awarded a $480 million contract to develop a hypersonic air-launched, rapid response weapon (ARRW). The award could be worth as much as $780 million over five years, assuming the company is authorized to move into low-rate initial production. Lockheed beat out Boeing (NYSE:BA), Raytheon (NYSE:RTN), and Northrop Grumman (NYSE:NOC) for the award. It's the second major hypersonic win for Lockheed Martin in recent months, following a $928 million award back in April to develop a separate hypersonic conventional strike weapon (HCSW). Lockheed has also been working with NASA since 2014 to create a hypersonic version of its SR-72 spy plane, an award worth $892 million, and is developing a high-speed commercial prototype. The Air Force views the HCSW approach as using existing technologies that have not been integrated for air-launched hypersonic weapons, while the ARRW approach is focused on developing new technologies. A clear leader If the awards offer the impression that Lockheed Martin is out ahead of its rivals in hypersonic development, the commentary accompanying the decision leaves little doubt. In a "justification and approval" document announcing the latest contract, military officials said that Lockheed alone is already far along in developing the air-launched booster and ordnance subsystems necessary for the ARRW program, adding that "Lockheed Martin has also already overcome industrywide staffing challenges." In short, "no other contractor has this level of design maturity," according to the document. The government concluded it would have had to absorb up to $118 million in duplicate development costs had it selected a company other than Lockheed Martin. Secretary of the Air Force Heather A. Wilson, in a statement announcing the latest award, made it clear that contractor readiness is an important factor. "We are going to go fast and leverage the best technology available to get hypersonic capability to the warfighter as soon as possible," Wilson said. Is there time to catch up? All is not lost for the other contractors. Northrop, for example, is a subcontractor on the Lockheed Martin Tactical Boost Glide program that is now part of the ARRW. And while the exact size of the potential opportunity for the industry is not yet known, these awards that Lockheed Martin has won are likely to be just the beginning. The fiscal 2018 omnibus spending bill passed by Congress included more than $16 billion for munitions, about $2 billion more than requested, and fiscal 2019 spending will rise to $20 billion. Only a fraction of that is for hypersonic research and development. But with Russia claiming to have already deployed a hypersonic system, and China said to be nearing that point, it seems like a mini arms race has begun. It's likely the Pentagon will do what it can to make sure the domestic hypersonic competition does not become a one-horse race. Military officials in the documentation supporting the ARRW award said that "potential competition may become available" as other contracts are awarded in hypersonics, suggesting that there are still opportunities for Northrop, Raytheon, and Boeing to get involved. More than just the F-35 Regardless of whether others catch up, hypersonics should go a long way toward making a bull case for shares of Lockheed Martin. Hypersonics are part of a broader missile and missile-defense operation that is developing into a powerful second leg for the company. Its growth should help counter fears over the company's reliance on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which currently accounts for about 30% of total company revenue and is only now beginning to ramp toward maturity. Lockheed Martin's THAAD anti-ballistic-missile system is the deterrent of choice for the United States and its allies for dealing with potential hostile ballistic launches from North Korea and elsewhere. Lockheed also was recently awarded up to $2.9 billion to develop and begin manufacturing a fleet of infrared satellites to replace an existing system put in place to provide early detection and warning. The company's second-quarter results came in ahead of expectations in part because, the company says, it is currently winning a lot more competitions than it had forecast. During the conference call to discuss results, management said that some of those wins were in classified areas, which likely include a healthy amount of missile and missile defense work. Combine missiles with the F-35 ramp and add in other opportunities --including the potential for increased sales from its Sikorsky helicopter unit, an F-22 update, and even continued interest in the aging F-16 -- and it's clear Lockheed Martin is working on a powerful arsenal. Its shares aren't cheap, up more than 50% over the past three years and trading at a defense-high 35 times earnings. But it increasingly appears the company's operations have the growth potential needed to justify its share price. Expect shares of Lockheed Martin to maintain cruise velocity.

#### Arms sales are key – funding is zero-sum.

Calio & Hess 14 – Vince Calio and Alexander E.M. Hess, reporters, citing data directly from Lockheed Martin. [Here Are the 5 Companies Making a Killing Off Wars Around the World, 3-14-2014, https://time.com/24735/here-are-the-5-companies-making-a-killing-off-wars-around-the-world/]//BPS

1. Lockheed Martin

> Arm sales 2012: $36 billion

> Total sales 2012: $47.2 billion

> 2012 profit: 2.7 billion

> 2012 employment: 120,000

In 2012, Lockheed Martin Corp. (NYSE: LMT) led the world in arms sales, even as its arms sales declined slightly from $36.2 billion in 2011 to $36 billion in 2012. Such sales accounted for 95% of the Maryland company’s total revenue. The company, which employed 120,000 workers as of 2012, specializes in aerospace, global security and information technology systems for the military. It is also known for the C-5 Galaxy Class airplane — the largest air military transport plane in the world. Lockheed Martin has been the largest recipient of government procurement contracts and the top-ranked company on the Washington Technology Top 100 for 19 consecutive years. However, this has also left the company exposed to changes in the federal budget. In October 2012, at the request of President Obama, the company held off on firing thousands of workers that it previously warned it would have to lay off due to military spending cuts.

#### Funding’s critical – winning the hypersonic race prevents nuclear war.

Tirpak 18 – John A. Tirpak, Editorial Director of Air Force Magazine, Post-Graduate Aviation Researcher at the Smithsonian Institution National Air & Space Museum, citing Michael D. Griffin, the former head of NASA, now Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Aerospace Engineer, Mark J. Lewis, director of IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, a former chief scientist of the Air Force, and a leading expert in hypersonics, and Kevin G. Bowcutt, Boeing hypersonics expert. [The Great Hypersonic Race, 6-27-2018, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-great-hypersonic-race/]//BPS

China, the US, and Russia are each striving to be the first nation to develop hypersonic systems: aircraft and missiles that can cruise and maneuver at five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) or faster. The winner of this technology contest will have daunting military advantages. Such weapons promise the ability to hit targets from very long ranges, yet with such speed and surprise that defending against them is extremely difficult. Hypersonic weapons could give those that possess them tactical capabilities with potentially strategic effects. Its potential disruptive effect on military operations—the ability to fly at a mile a second at Mach 5—is most often compared to that of stealth and precision weapons when those technologies appeared in the 1980s. The consensus view is that China, so far, is winning the hypersonics race, largely through financial brute force. USAF Gen. Paul J. Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in January that China has made hypersonics research “a national program”—a kind of Manhattan Project—and it is “willing to spend … up to hundreds of billions to solve the problems of hypersonic flight, hypersonic target designation and then, ultimately, engagement.” Chinese state media announced in March, for example, that China is building a 265-meter long wind tunnel to simulate the environment from Mach 10 to Mach 25, which is to be complete by 2020. It already has tunnels capable of simulating conditions between Mach 5 to 9. Though the US has hypersonic tunnels, most are quite small, for tests lasting less than a few seconds. Russia, meanwhile, announced in March that it is testing the “Kinzhal” missile, which president Vladimir Putin boasted can fly at Mach 10, has a range beyond 2,000 kilometers, can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, and can defeat any existing “or prospective” air defense system. Although many leading US technologists scoffed at the claim, US Strategic Command chief Gen. John E. Hyten confirmed to reporters at a Colorado space conference in April that both China and Russia are flight-testing hypersonic concepts, saying “you should believe Vladimir Putin about everything he said he’s working on.” While Hyten said it’s a “different issue” as to whether those systems are deployed, “we … listen to what they say very closely, and none of what he did … [or] said surprised me.” TORTOISE AND THE HARE The US is believed to have had a commanding lead toward fielding hypersonic systems until about five years ago. In 2013, the X-51 program, building on several previous projects, achieved more than 200 seconds of air-breathing Mach 5 flight, proving it could be done. The program then concluded and wasn’t immediately followed up. A number of US successor programs were either terminated for budgetary reasons or cancelled for experiencing failures, even though the technology is in many ways still in its infancy. Pentagon and congressional leaders in the last two years have decried the risk-averse defense acquisition culture that favors only “sure things” instead of gambling on chancy but potentially high-payoff research. Most hypersonic research follows one of two main avenues. One leads to a “boost-glide” vehicle in which an aerodynamic shape is mounted on a rocket and accelerated to hypersonic speed. The vehicle then detaches and coasts to its target, able to maneuver but gradually bleeding off its energy as it flies. The other main approach aims for an air-breathing vehicle also propelled to hypersonic speed by a rocket, but then an internal supersonic combustion ramjet—or scramjet—takes over. The vehicle separates from the rocket and propels itself through the atmosphere, taking in air to mix with and burn internal fuel and creating thrust, but without the rotors and compressors of a turbine engine. Complex shaping of the inlet, exhaust and combustion chamber, along with highly precise holes, ducts, and bypasses is necessary to make this approach work. Underlying technologies for hypersonics include advanced computers that can calculate shapes and airflow, additive or 3-D manufacturing that can make the exotic shapes necessary for the inlets and ducting, and materials—metals and ceramics—that can withstand the extreme temperatures and pressures of hypersonic flight. There will also need to be guidance mechanisms that can function under those same stresses without being crushed or melted. Leading US technologists believe either the boost-glide or air-breathing approaches will yield operational missile systems in under five years, and more test flights akin to the X-51—possibly secret—are forecast to take place this year. A more advanced concept, generally considered 10 years away or more, would make use of a “combined cycle engine” approach. The objective vehicle would take off from a runway, accelerate through Mach 1, achieve hypersonic speed, carry out a mission—spying, show of force, or delivering weapons—and return to base for reuse. This goal is challenging because the qualities that make for an efficient engine in the subsonic and transonic regimes simply won’t work in the hypersonic regime, because of the different way that air behaves at those speeds. Meanwhile, China is plowing ahead. The Pentagon’s new research and engineering czar, Michael D. Griffin, said in March that China has made 20 times as many hypersonic technology tests as the US has in the last five years. Speaking at a McAleese/Credit Suisse defense conference just days after taking the top Pentagon R&E job, Griffin, the former head of NASA, said the US must demonstrate its resolve to lead in hypersonics. If the Chinese are unchallenged in this area, they could “hold at risk our carrier battle groups … [and] our entire surface fleet,” Griffin warned. “They hold at risk our forward-deployed forces and land-based forces.” Lacking either a defense or an ability to respond in-kind, the US faces poor choices. “Our only response is either to let them have their way, or go nuclear.” And that, he said, is “an unacceptable situation for the United States.” Hypersonic technology, Griffin declared, is his “No. 1 priority.” In a discussion at the Hudson Institute in April, Griffin said there are ways to defend against hypersonics, but there’s only a brief window for doing so. Such missiles “are relatively fragile during their long phase of cruise flight” and are “fairly easy to destabilize,” Griffin noted. They also glow brightly in the infrared, because of the heat they generate, and “yes, they can maneuver, but they can’t maneuver in their cruise phase as easily as an interceptor.” DEAD MEAT However, “if you let [hypersonic weapons] get into terminal phase, where we’ve observed that they can pull many G’s, then that becomes a hard target,” Griffin allowed. “If you allow an attacking vehicle to get close enough to begin its terminal dive …and [that] might be from 100,000 feet … you’re probably dead meat because that’s a very hard intercept problem… at that point.” He noted that hypersonic weapons “overfly our air defense systems and underfly our missile defense systems. So China has, over the last decade, with great care, [become] capable of … holding our forward-based assets at risk.” Those carriers and forward-based forces are strategic assets and the “means by which we project strategic power short of nuclear deterrence.” Without countering it, “we allow their tactical systems to leverage our ability to project strategic power.” The US will have to develop means to defend against hypersonic missiles soon, Griffin said. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will have that responsiblity, not the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). By July, Griffin was expected to finish a new hypersonics roadmap that would rationalize and coordinate at least a half dozen projects within and between the Air Force, Army and Navy, DARPA, the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office, NASA, and defense contractors. Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan told reporters in April that Griffin had just delivered “80 percent” of the plan and was working on the final version. “The overlap of the technical challenges is pretty high,” Shanahan said of the various approaches being taken. The basic physics of getting to hypersonic speed and maintaining it, while preserving maneuvering capability, are common to the various approaches underway, he asserted. The Pentagon will look for synergy between the programs, seeking to consolidate them where practical, saving money but also sharing information. The services would integrate their own unique requirements as to whether their specific vehicles are air-, land- or sea-launched. The roadmap, Shanahan said, will cross “10 technical domains” and determine the critical tests that must be conducted in the next five years “to achieve capability within the next decade.” The document might just as well be called a “hypersonic prototype plan,” Shanahan said. The roadmap will also inform the Pentagon’s five-year spending plan. Mark J. Lewis, director of IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, a former chief scientist of the Air Force and a leading expert in hypersonics, said there are “a couple of characteristics I would want to see in a generic [hypersonics] roadmap.” Lewis is not involved in developing the plan, which is likely classified. He spoke to Air Force Magazine as a sidebar to an AFA technology podcast. DON’T RULE ANYTHING OUT First, Lewis said the plan should “build directly on past successes. Meaning, stop reinventing the wheel.” At least one successor program to the X-51, he said, largely repeats what that project already achieved, with some minor additions. Second, he said, the roadmap “shouldn’t zero-in to a single technology solution. It shouldn’t be just air-breathing or just boost-glide. They have different strengths [and] weaknesses and different applications.” Necking down to a single, quick-and-dirty approach “to me, would be a wrong answer.” He also advised that while hypersonics as a conventional strategic weapon may very well be what China is looking for, it doesn’t have to be that and, for the US, “the winning applications are not the strategic applications.” The US could develop hypersonic air-to-air missiles, for example, that could destroy enemy aircraft at great distances, before they could pose a threat. There is also the potential for air-to-ground missiles covering 100 miles in as many seconds, offering opportunities to destroy enemy air defenses from standoff range. Given the extreme destructive force of an impacting vehicle traveling at Mach 6, a warhead might not even be necessary. Such applications “are the ones most likely to be useful to the United States, frankly,” Lewis asserted. Air Force Research Laboratory chief Maj. Gen. William T. Cooley, in a February interview, took issue with the characterization of some post-X-51 efforts as a virtual repeat of that program. “I would say that’s not true and largely because of the people,” Cooley averred. “The same scientists and engineers who had been working on the X-51 are continuing to advance our hypersonics portfolio, and so they are well aware … of the data that was collected” on that program. “We’re advancing the ball forward,” he added, saying the X-51 was “a point design …to prove out our understanding and we’re building on that.” The Pentagon is taking hypersonics much more seriously—budget-wise—than it did in the past. Boeing hypersonics expert Kevin G. Bowcutt, whose experience stretches back to the National Aerospace Plane project of the early 1980s, said in an interview that Pentagon funding for hypersonics after NASP “has had an oscillatory funding profile,” going up and down between $50 and $100 million a year. In Fiscal 2017, the Defense Department funded hypersonics to the tune of just $85.5 million, and that rose to $108.6 million in Fiscal 2018, but exploded to $256.7 million in the 2019 budget request. Congress has indicated its willingness to support that figure, and even add to it. “This may be a ‘Sputnik moment,’?” Bowcutt said of the sudden turnaround in both interest and financial support of hypersonics, driven by the prospect of being behind China and maybe Russia. ACRONYM MENAGERIE The Air Force has been working with DARPA for several years on two hypersonic projects. One is the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, or HAWC, and the other is the Tactical Boost-Glide program, or TBG. The Air Force chose Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop its HAWC concept, while Lockheed is the prime contractor for TBG. Additionally, the Air Force is launching two new prototyping efforts in the Fiscal 2019 budget, with $260 million: the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, and the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, HCSW, which USAF pronounces as “Hacksaw.” The service awarded Lockheed Martin the HCSW contract in late April; it has an

#### AND it rips apart diplomatic options in Asia

Henderson 19 – Mark Henderson, a colonel in the U.S. Army. [HYPERSONICS: THE NEW 'SPUTNIK' MOMENT? 9-6-2019, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/hypersonics-new-sputnik-moment/]//BPS

Consider how hypersonics in the hands of adversaries could make it difficult for the United States and its allies to respond with diplomatic levers to developing situations in the international environment. An article posted in The Hill suggests that hypersonic weapons armed with conventional warheads could avoid detection and travel exceptionally quickly, inducing great confusion and critical lags in a defender’s ability to respond. The strategic shock of exploiting this activity gets worse: experts suggest the “effects could be so destructive that they would mimic… nuclear use, without the actual risk of employing nuclear weapons.” This kind of attack could lead to a scenario where preemption may be the only way to counter the capability. Such preemption risks immediate escalation, precluding a more measured diplomatic response. A RAND Corporation study determined that “threatened nations [would] take such actions as… a launch-on-warning posture, or policy of preemption during a crisis.” The high rate of speed these weapons travel after launch would lead to even more challenges with how to counter the threat.

#### We’re down to ONE prototyping effort – budget is tight.

Pawlyk 20 – Oriana Pawlyk, reporter, citing Ann Stefanek, USAF service spokeswoman. [Air Force Cancels 'Hacksaw' Hypersonic Weapons Program, 2-11-20, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/11/air-force-cancels-hacksaw-hypersonic-weapons-program.html]//BPS

As the global race for hypersonic weapons intensifies, the U.S. military just decided to abandon one of its fundamental prototype programs.

The U.S. Air Force on Monday said it will cancel its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon, known as HCSW (pronounced "Hacksaw"), in order to shift resources to its other program, the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW). Both prototypes are designed by Lockheed Martin Corp.

"Due to budget priorities, the Air Force down-selected to one hypersonic weapon prototyping effort this year," spokeswoman Ann Stefanek said. Instead, she said, the service will concentrate efforts on ARRW, which is "on track for an early operational capability in fiscal 2022."

Stefanek explained that ARRW -- pronounced "Arrow" -- offers a "unique glide body design as compared to other prototyping efforts."

"We will continue to work collaboratively with our sister services to see how we can most effectively leverage each other's capabilities, ensuring the most prudent use of taxpayer dollars," she said.

The Air Force informed Lockheed of its decision on Monday; the service will still continue to work with Lockheed on HCSW until the prototype's critical design review in the spring before the termination, Stefanek said.

In its fiscal 2021 budget request unveiled Monday, the Air Force said it needs $382 million for hypersonics research, test and development. Last year, lawmakers gave the service $576 million for the effort.

"The HCSW team pioneered significant advancements in hypersonic technology development and integration of existing, mature technologies for use in various hypersonic efforts across the Department of Defense, including Army, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency programs," Stefanek said. "These advancements will serve to expedite the generation and demonstration of various hypersonic weapon capabilities in the near future."

The contract for the Hacksaw project was awarded in 2018. It was estimated to cost as much as $928 million over the course of its lifetime.

Hypersonic weapons are meant to move at five times the speed of sound or more. While little has been disclosed on either Air Force program, Aerojet Rocketdyne announced last year it would partner with Lockheed on the HCSW endeavor.

The company said it has worked on creating both solid-fueled and air-breathing ramjet and scramjet capabilities for hypersonic technologies, and pointed to its successful test of the the X-51A Waverider, a hydrocarbon-fueled and scramjet-powered cruise missile prototype that was the first to achieve hypersonic speeds in 2013.

Aerojet in September said it was looking in part to use Waverider as a blueprint for HCSW.

Scramjet -- short for supersonic combustion ramjet -- technologies use an airbreathing jet engine that compresses incoming air, but needs to retain extreme high speeds to compress that air. In order to do that, they are first propelled by a booster to reach hypersonic speeds.

Meanwhile, the Air Force conducted its first test of the AGM-183A ARRW in June, flying the weapon on a B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base, California. ARRW, which has a tactical boost-glide body, completed its preliminary design review in March 2019, Lockheed said at the time.

#### It collapses deterrence, there’s no norms or arms control, and causes accidents---nothing checks

R. Jeffrey Smith 19, Managing Editor for National Security at the Center for Public Integrity, Former Editor and Correspondent for The Washington Post who won the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting, Master of Science Degree from the Columbia University School of Journalism, Awarded a Fellowship at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, “Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race.”, The New York Times, 6/19/2019, Lexis

Development of hypersonics is moving so quickly, however, that it threatens to outpace any real discussion about the potential perils of such weapons, including how they may disrupt efforts to avoid accidental conflict, especially during crises. There are currently no international agreements on how or when hypersonic missiles can be used, nor are there any plans between any countries to start those discussions. Instead, the rush to possess weapons of incredible speed and maneuverability has pushed the United States into a new arms race with Russia and China — one that could, some experts worry, upend existing norms of deterrence and renew Cold War-era tensions.

Although hypersonic missiles can in theory carry nuclear warheads, those being developed by the United States will only be equipped with small conventional explosives. With a length between just five and 10 feet, weighing about 500 pounds and encased in materials like ceramic and carbon fiber composites or nickel-chromium superalloys, the missiles function like nearly invisible power drills that smash holes in their targets, to catastrophic effect. After their launch — whether from the ground, from airplanes or from submarines — they are pulled by gravity as they descend from a powered ascent, or propelled by highly advanced engines. The missiles’ kinetic energy at the time of impact, at speeds of at least 1,150 miles per hour, makes them powerful enough to penetrate any building material or armored plating with the force of three to four tons of TNT.

They could be aimed, in theory, at Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missiles being carried on trucks or rails. Or the Chinese could use their own versions of these missiles to target American bombers and other aircraft at bases in Japan or Guam. Or the missiles could attack vital land- or sea-based radars anywhere, or military headquarters in Asian ports or near European cities. The weapons could even suddenly pierce the steel decks of one of America’s 11 multibillion-dollar aircraft carriers, instantly stopping flight operations, a vulnerability that might eventually render the floating behemoths obsolete. Hypersonic missiles are also ideal for waging a decapitation strike — assassinating a country’s top military or political officials. “Instant leader-killers,” a former Obama administration White House official, who asked not to be named, said in an interview.

Within the next decade, these new weapons could undertake a task long imagined for nuclear arms: a first strike against another nation’s government or arsenals, interrupting key chains of communication and disabling some of its retaliatory forces, all without the radioactive fallout and special condemnation that might accompany the detonation of nuclear warheads. That’s why a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine report said in 2016 that hypersonics aren’t “simply evolutionary threats” to the United States but could in the hands of enemies “challenge this nation’s tenets of global vigilance, reach and power.”

The arrival of such fast weaponry will dangerously compress the time during which military officials and their political leaders — in any country — can figure out the nature of an attack and make reasoned decisions about the wisdom and scope of defensive steps or retaliation. And the threat that hypersonics pose to retaliatory weapons creates what scholars call “use it or lose it” pressures on countries to strike first during a crisis. Experts say that the missiles could upend the grim psychology of Mutual Assured Destruction, the bedrock military doctrine of the nuclear age that argued globe-altering wars would be deterred if the potential combatants always felt certain of their opponents’ devastating response.

#### Global nuclear war

Dr. Richard H. Speier 17, Adjunct Staff with the RAND Corp, Founded the Office of Non- Proliferation Policy at the DOD, Recipient of the Meritorious Civilian Service Medal as the “Father of the MTCR,” now Consults in the Washington DC area; George Nacouzi, Senior Engineer at the RAND Corporation, Supports Projects within PAF (Project Air Force) and NSRD (National Security Research Division), Carrie A. Lee, Researcher at RAND, and Richard M. Moore, Researcher at RAND. 2017. “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.” RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR2137.html

Strategic Implications of Hypersonic Weapons Compressed Timelines The U.S. military uses an acronym to describe the decisionmaking and action process cycle: OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). These four steps take time, and hypersonic missiles compress available response time to the point that a lesser nation’s strategic forces might be disarmed before acting. As an illustration of the time required to act with respect to an existential missile threat, the Nuclear Threat Initiative organization estimated a timeline for a U.S. response to a massive Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack, as follows:9 • 0 minutes—Russia launches missiles • 1 minute—U.S. satellite detects missiles • 2 minutes—U.S. radar detects missiles • 3 minutes—North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) assesses information (2 minutes max) • 4 minutes—NORAD alerts White House • 5 minutes—first detonations of submarine-launched ballistic missiles • 7 minutes—locate president and advisers, assemble them, brief them, get decision (8 minutes max) • 13 minutes—decision • 15 minutes—transmit orders to start launch sequence • 20 minutes—launch officers receive, decode, and authenticate orders • 23 minutes—complete launch sequence (2 minutes max) • 25 minutes—Russian ICBM detonations. This timeline is not, of course, representative of two hostile parties in closer proximity or with less effective warning systems than Russia and the United States. Nor is it representative of less-than-Armageddon possibilities. However, for adjacent enemies within a 1,000-km range, a hypersonic missile traveling at ten times the speed of sound could cover that distance and reduce response times to about six minutes.10 Targets As discussed earlier, hypersonic missiles increase the threat over current generations of missiles in cases where the target nation has missile defenses. The targets in such nations would primarily be high value and heavily defended. Prime targets could include destroying a nation’s leadership and command and control, referred to as “decapitation,” to prevent the target nation from responding with an effective follow-on attack. Other key targets could be carrier strike groups, with the objective of striking a key blow or pushing the naval formation further from the coast. And, because of their time sensitivity, strategic forces and storage facilities for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) could warrant hypersonic attack. Implications for Targeted Nations Any government faced with the possibility that hypersonic missiles would be employed against it—particularly in a decapitating attack— would plan countermeasures, many of which could be destabilizing. For example, countermeasures could include devolution of strategic forces’ command and control so that lower levels of authority could execute a strategic strike, which would obviously increase the risk of accidental strategic war; or strategic forces could be more widely dispersed— a tactic risking greater exposure to subnational capture. An obvious measure would be a launch-on-warning posture—a hair-trigger tactic that would increase crisis instability. Or the target nation could adopt a policy of preemption during a crisis—guaranteeing highly destructive military action. To be sure, such measures could be invoked against threats from current types of missiles.11 But, for nations with effective ballistic mis- sile and/or cruise missile defenses in the time frame when hypersonic missiles might proliferate, the hard choices would be forced when facing hypersonic threats. Advanced nations with adequate resources could take other steps against hypersonic threats. They could strengthen the resilience of their command and control, harden the siting of their strategic forces, and make a deterrent force mobile or sea-based. These tactics may or may not be effective, especially for lesser nations. And they certainly will be expensive—putting them out of reach of some. Even for major powers, the proliferation of hypersonic missiles will create new threats by allowing lesser powers to hold them at risk of effective missile attacks especially against “unhardened” targets, e.g., cities. Over the coming decades, the ability of a lesser nation with a handful of ICBMs to threaten major powers will continue to decrease as wide area missile defenses continue to improve. However, HGVs and HCMs will be more difficult to defend against. Implications for Major Powers The ability of hypersonic missiles to penetrate advanced missile defenses will increase the risks for nations with such defenses. Lesser powers with hypersonic weapons may see these weapons as a deterrent against greater power intervention, and feel free to pursue potentially destabilizing regional agendas. Moreover, lesser nations with hypersonic missiles could affect the force deployments of major powers. As noted above, carrier strike groups might be pushed further out to sea or an intervening power’s regional military bases might become exposed to more effective attacks. The Broader Picture of Increased Risk The ability of hypersonic forces to penetrate defenses and compress decision time could aggravate the instabilities in regions that are already tense—for example, Iran-Israel and North Korea–Japan. Conflicts in these regions could evolve to include major powers aligned on opposite sides. An Israel-Iran conflict, with the United States and much of Europe aligned with Israel and Russia and perhaps China aligned with Iran, would create new paths for escalation to an even-larger conflict. The basic roles of external actors would not necessarily change—the alignments would stay the same—but external powers might suddenly find themselves in a more-unstable situation in which their patron states are increasingly trigger-happy. As noted previously, lesser powers could gain influence over major powers by threatening a hypersonic attack. At the least, lesser powers might be emboldened if they saw themselves as possessing a deterrent against major power intervention. Finally, because hypersonic weapons increase the expectation of a disarming attack, they lower the threshold for military action.

#### Each scenario goes global, it’s most probable, and it implodes any arms control

Michael Richardson 13, Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, Former South-East Asia Correspondent of The Age, “Cruise Missile Threat in Asia”, Japan Times, 6/18/2013, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/06/18/commentary/world-commentary/cruise-missile-threat-in-asia/#.XYY4IkZJFwB

Cruise missiles that are difficult to detect, increasingly fast and capable of carrying nuclear warheads are spreading, especially in Asia, complicating arms control and raising the risk of catastrophic conflict.

Until recently, most concerns have focused on the actual or potential spread of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in China, North Korea, India and Pakistan — the four Asian states known to have atomic arms. Ballistic missiles, launched by rocket engines, follow an arc-like trajectory, attaining hypersonic speeds on the downward leg of their guided journey towards a target.

Until now and probably for some time yet, all long-range ballistic missiles, with atomic warheads small enough to fit on them, are deployed exclusively for strategic nuclear deterrence. The five official nuclear weapon states — United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — use their long-range ballistic missiles, whether launched from land, air or sea, to deter possible attacks by other nuclear-armed nations.

Arms control treaties and agreements have tended to focus chiefly on ballistic missiles. However, another type of weapon, the cruise missile, is multiplying. It is proving to be even more difficult to control, partly because in many cases the same highly accurate missile is designed to carry either a conventional high explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead.

This dual role makes it impossible for a nuclear-armed nation facing a cruise missile attack against its territory or warships to know whether the incoming weapons are conventional or nuclear, an uncertainty that could trigger a nuclear response. Dual-role ballistic missiles of less than intercontinental range pose a similar problem.

The U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command reported last month that both China and North Korea were developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The U.S. and Russia lead the world with nuclear-capable cruise missiles, weapons launched from long-range bombers or submarines. But India and Pakistan are also developing such missiles. They each have several different types, with different ranges, in service or being flight tested.

Cruise missiles, powered by jet engines, travel low and fast over land or water, making them difficult to detect. They are also relatively small, compared to long-range ballistic missiles.

There are about 1,140 of the nuclear version of the U.S. AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile in America’s nuclear arsenal. In addition, there are about 460 nuclear-capable AGM-129A advanced cruise missiles. The U.S. Air Force says that the streamlined design of the AGM-129A, combined with radar-absorbing material and several other features, make it virtually impossible to detect on radar.

The range of the U.S. AGM-129 A is officially put at almost 3,220 km. However, the nuclear-ready version of Russia’s Raduga Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile, which is due to become operational this year, is designed to have a maximum flight distance of just over 9,650 km, which puts it in the range category of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The new Chinese and North Korean cruise missiles appeared on a slide of an unclassified briefing given by Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, head of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, on May 7. The slide shows nuclear weapon modernizations in eight of the world’s nine states known to have atomic arms. Only Israel is not shown.

The Chinese cruise missile is the CJ-20 carried by the long-range H-6 bomber. Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons specialist with the Federation of American Scientists, said the listing was the first he had seen in an official U.S. publication crediting a Chinese air-launched cruise missile with nuclear capability.

U.S. defense officials say that a Chinese extended range H-6 bomber using the CJ-20 in a land-attack operation could strike targets all over Asia and eastern Russia as well as the U.S. military base hub on Guam island, in the western Pacific. Two-thirds of Russian territory, east of the Ural mountains, is in Asia.

The nuclear-capable North Korean cruise missile listed on the briefing slide is the KN-09 for coastal defense. It reportedly has a range of just 100 to 120 km.

America’s AGM-86 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles travel at just over two-thirds the speed of sound.

Meanwhile, India is looking to its supersonic Brahmos cruise missile, a joint venture with Russia, as the key new weapon that will give it a strategic advantage over its neighbor and long-time rival, Pakistan. The Brahmos is the only known supersonic cruise missile system in service. Its designer, BrahMos Aerospace of Russia, says it travels at two to three times the speed of sound, or approximately one kilometer per second.

In October, India and Russia agreed to produce more than 1,000 Brahmos missiles for the Indian Air Force, Navy and Army. The two sides also decided to jointly develop a hypersonic version of the missile that would fly more than five times the speed of sound.

The Indian missile, which can be launched from the sea, air or land, has a range of about 300 km. It can carry a conventional or nuclear warhead. The high speed of India’s Brahmos cruise missile means it has the potential to carry out prompt strikes on extremist camps inside Pakistan, to be followed by a punitive invasion by the Indian armed forces.

Because India is so much bigger and stronger than Pakistan, the latter has developed short-range ballistic missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads to deter such attacks. Although still to be verified, Pakistan claims it has miniaturized nuclear warheads so that they will also fit on cruise missiles. India also says that its cruise missiles are nuclear-capable.

The short-warning time should either country use such weapons against the other means that escalation into an all-out nuclear exchange could result.

Shyam Saran, convener of India’s National Security Advisory Board, said in April that in a crisis with Pakistan, India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. He warned that even if India was attacked with relatively small, or tactical, nuclear arms, it would “engage in nuclear retaliation that will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary.”

There is a wider warning here for Asian countries with tactical nuclear-tipped cruise or ballistic missiles in operation or planned. If ever used, such weapons could open a Pandora’s Box of horrendous consequences, proving that a limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.

### 1AC---Israel

#### Key to deter ME adversaries.

Makovsky 20 [Michael Makovsky, Phd and Gen Charles “Chuck” Wald, Usaf (Ret.), 10-23-2020, "How the U.S. Can Help Israel Maintain its Military Edge", JINSA, https://jinsa.org/how-the-u-s-can-help-israel-maintain-its-military-edge/, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]

Ensuring Israel’s military edge is in America’s basic self-interest and commands overwhelming bipartisan support. It means assisting Israel in maintaining military superiority over its neighbors, so that it can defend itself by itself.

As the United States retrenches from the Middle East, the value of a strong and capable Israel has only grown. Israel has shouldered the burden of countering U.S. enemies (Iran, ISIS, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood) while strengthening the security of U.S. partners (Jordan and Egypt), without requiring American boots on the ground.

Israel’s edge, however, has been eroding for years. Iran has been expanding its regional footprint and boosting the capabilities of Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Houthis and other Shia militias in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, all while continuing to develop its nuclear program. It, and an increasingly aggressive Turkey, have invested in drones, advanced air defense capabilities and ballistic missiles. Israel’s Arab neighbors, in response, have embarked on buying sprees of advanced weapons.

Middle Eastern instability means today’s friend could become tomorrow’s adversary. The UAE, an American ally and treaty partner with Israel, poses no threat today to Israel, but one can’t be sure what the future holds. What we do know is that Qatar, hardly a reliable U.S. partner, just requested to purchase F-35s, with other regional countries sure to follow.

Previously, when the United States sold advanced weapons to Arab countries, it subsequently supplied Israel with more weaponry. For instance, in 1989, after selling Saudi Arabia hundreds of latest-generation tanks, the United States emplaced $100 million of military equipment in Israel, and accessible to Israel, in a stockpile known as WRSA-I.

We recently spelled out several steps America should take to preserve Israel’s ability to defend itself by itself, and one of the most important is to restock the WRSA-I with modern equipment, especially precision-guided munitions (PGMs) such as the Joint Direct Attack Munitions. The existing stockpile has become obsolete and useless. We understand it hasn’t been upgraded since before the Obama administration, over 10 years ago.

PGMs are crucial for Israel because they can accurately hit ground targets while limiting collateral damage such as civilian casualties. Israel already uses many U.S.-sourced PGMs to roll back Iran’s region-wide military entrenchment. But in the event of a major war with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah with its 130,000 missiles and rockets, it will need many more. An emergency resupply of Israel, amid conflict, such as during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, would take time. Better to plan ahead.

Prepositioning PGMs in WRSA-I and providing Israel emergency access (via sale or transfer), while retaining U.S. control, would solve this shortfall. It also would be consistent with language in the current Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act: “To the extent practicable, the Secretary of Defense should take further measures to expedite deliveries of precision-guided munitions to Israel.”

#### Middle East war goes global AND nuclear.

Pleasance 20, senior foreign news reporter with dailymail (Chris, January 3rd, 2020, “How could Iran crisis lead to World War Three? Tehran could hit back with cyber-attacks or terror attacks on US forces and Israel - provoking Donald Trump to retaliate in tit-for-tat that could drag in Saudi Arabia, Russia, China and Turkey”, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7848703/How-Iran-crisis-lead-World-War-Three.html>)

Iran has vowed to exact a 'crushing revenge' on American forces in retaliation for the killing of Quds commander Qassem Soleimani - leaving the Middle East on the brink of a conflict that could quickly spiral into World War 3. The Iranian National Security Council is currently meeting in Tehran - chaired by Ayatollah Khamenei himself for the first time ever - to consider its response. At their disposal is the world's 13th most powerful military, a host of militia groups spread across the Middle East, proxy-forces such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, and allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Targets in their crosshairs are likely to include US troops and military bases in Iraq and Syria, Israeli forces in the Golan Heights, tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure. While initial strikes are likely to be limited, they could herald a tit-for-tat series of events - drawing in Russian forces stationed in Syria defending a key Iranian ally in Bashar al-Assad, and Turkish forces fighting in the country's north. China also has ships stationed in the Gulf of Oman and recently carried out joint naval drill with both Iran and Russia, raising the prospect that they could also become involved. Saudi Arabia is already engaged in a conflict with Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and any escalation by Tehran would be met with a response from Riyadh. Turkish strongman Recep Erdogan's troops are deployed in northern Syria and he is close to Russia and Iran as well as being a member of NATO - making his actions unpredictable if a conflict escalates across the region. The US, China, Russia and Israel all have nuclear weapons - with at least three of those possessing next-generation hypersonic missiles capable of breaching all defense systems. Israel is also armed with nuclear weapons and is an obvious target for any Iranian attacks, but Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF will not hesitate to defend themselves and have recently struck Iran-backed Hezbollah forces in Syria. If Iran decides to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, as it has often threatened to do in the past, a host of world powers including European nations which rely on the oil which flows through the waterway could find themselves having to defend their interests. Ultimately, if the tit-for-tat exchanges between these countries escalated far enough it is conceivable but unlikely that it would end with a nuclear exchange - and destruction on a global scale.

## T

### 2AC---C/I

#### NATO is a multi-tiered alliance. Partner countries are included.

Matláry 14 [Matláry, J.H. (2014). Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions. In: Mayer, S. (eds) NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137330307_14> DOA: 6/20/2022 //ArchanSen]

In this chapter, I discuss the importance of burden-sharing partnerships with NATO as a development that is, as I argue, symptomatic of the evolution of the Alliance into becoming an arena or platform for coalitions of the ‘willing and able’. After the end of the Cold War, we live in an era where armed attacks against one or several Alliance members, obliging others to respond immediately (although not necessarily by military means), have become rare and unlikely. As a result, the organization has increasingly turned into a ‘two-tiered’ or ‘multi-tiered’ alliance. Current operations are mostly Article 4 and hence, unlike Article 5 cases, voluntary. This implies that partners, as well as members, may contribute. Moreover, few members seem to be willing and able to make a contribution,1 something that inter alia the Libya operation has shown — only eight allies were actually willing to contribute combat capabilities. In other operations, like ISAF, all members contribute, but only a few with risk-willing capabilities. All ‘show the flag’, but few are willing and able to contribute to sharp operations that require top skill and risk-willingness.

### 2AC---A2: No Arms to Ukraine

#### Baltic transfers solve.

CBS 22 [No Author, 1-22-2022, "Baltic nations to send missiles to Ukraine with U.S. support", No Publication, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/baltic-nations-missiles-ukraine-us-support-russia-crisis/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will send U.S.-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine in a move that Washington says it is fully endorsing amid Kyiv's escalating tensions with Russia.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a tweet Saturday that Washington saluted the three NATO nations and former Soviet republics "for their longstanding support to Ukraine".

"I expedited and authorized and we fully endorse transfers of defensive equipment NATO Allies Estonia Latvia Lithuania are providing to Ukraine to strengthen its ability to defend itself against Russia's unprovoked and irresponsible aggression," Blinken said in another tweet.

## CPs

### 2AC---A2: States CP

#### The federal government has exclusive authority.

Lucas and Vassalotti 20 [Nathan J. Lucas, Section Research Manager, and Michael J. Vassalotti, Section Research Manager, April 30 2020. CRS. “Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities”. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46337/2> DOA: 07-05-2022 //ArchanSen]

The sale and export of U.S.-origin weapons to foreign countries (“defense articles and defense services,” officially) are governed by an extensive set of laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. Congress has authorized such sales under two laws:

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §2151, et seq.

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §2751, et seq.

The FAA and AECA govern all transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and services, whether they are commercial sales, government-to-government sales, or security assistance/security cooperation grants (or building partnership capacity programs provided by U.S. military personnel). These measures can be provided by Title 22 (Foreign Relations) or Title 10 (Armed Services) authorities. Arms sold or transferred under these authorities are regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the U.S. Munitions List (USML), which are located in Title 22, Parts 120-130 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).

The two main methods for the sale and export of U.S.-made weapons are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licenses. Some other arms sales occur from current Department of Defense (DOD) stocks through Excess Defense Articles (EDA) provisions.

For FMS, the U.S. government procures defense articles as an intermediary for foreign partners’ acquisition of defense articles and defense services, which ensures that the articles have the same benefits and protections that apply to the U.S. military’s acquisition of its own articles and services.

For DCS, registered U.S. firms may sell defense articles directly to foreign partners though licenses and agreements received from the Department of State. Firms are still required to obtain State Department approval, and for major sales DOD review and congressional notification is required. In some cases where U.S. firms have entered into international partnerships to produce some major weapons systems, comprehensive export regulations under 22 CFR 126.14 are intended to allow exports and technical data for those systems without having to go through the licensing process.

### 2AC---A2: Process CPs

#### Timeframe DA – every hour is critical – any delay should be prevented.

Detsch and Mackinnon 6-2 [Jack Detsch, Amy Mackinnon, 6-2-2022, "Ukraine Wants Longer-Range Ammunition for Donbas Gunfight", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/ukraine-donbas-us-military-aid-long-range-missiles/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

“We are knowingly providing a less capable system despite the fact that they pledged they wouldn’t use the more capable system in ways we didn’t like,” one U.S. source briefed on the aid package told Foreign Policy, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing weapons transfers. “We’re still not giving them what they want.”

A source close to the Ukrainian government, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that there was “frustration” and “disappointment” at the decision not to arm the country with longer-range weapons. “Each hour, let alone each day and week, is critical for Ukraine,” they said.

### 1AR---A2: Process CPs

#### The delay is too late – Russia will win the war.

Milburn 6-27 [Andrew Milburn, 6-27-2022, "Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine", Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/time-is-not-on-kyivs-side-training-weapons-and-attrition-in-ukraine/, DOA: 7-1-2022 //ArchanSen]

Some might say that this commentary paints an overly gloomy picture for Ukraine—that game-changing weapons are on their way, and these will be enough to turn the tide. It is true that the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), already operating in Ukraine, is a formidable weapon and a welcome improvement on the Ukrainians’ over-used Soviet howitzers and even the recently supplied M777 lightweight 155-millimeter howitzer, whose deficiencies I have written about recently. Even lacking the long-range Army Tactical Missile System, HIMARS can bring accurate fires to bear at ranges exceeding forty miles within minutes of receiving data.

It will be weeks, however, before HIMARS is fielded in sufficient quantity to have a significant effect—maybe too late to reverse the Russian advance. The logistical exigencies of getting more into theater and then bringing Ukrainian artillery personnel to Germany or Poland for training stand in the way. Meanwhile the hemorrhage of casualties continues. And even when fielded, the HIMARS will not have the same effect for the Ukrainians as when employed by the US military, because of a shortfall in Ukrainian task organization. The tactical units we trained lacked forward observers, personnel trained to locate and report targets in a manner that can be rapidly transferred into firing data. The extremely centralized execution of artillery fire in the Ukrainian army makes for some effective fires for effect, such as the recent one that struck several Russian generals, but is not very responsive to the needs of frontline units.

### \*2AC---A2: Turkey PIC

#### Turkey won’t leave.

The Economist 22 [The Economist, 06-16-2022, "Is Turkey more trouble to NATO than it is worth?", Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/16/is-turkey-more-trouble-to-nato-than-it-is-worth, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

None of this spells doom for the relationship between Turkey and NATO. Western countries will try to work round Turkey’s veto by providing Finland and Sweden with security guarantees. This may leave Turkey sidelined within the alliance. But its departure or eviction from NATO is still fantasy. Turkey is on the front line of the war in Syria and close to other conflicts in the Middle East; it controls access to the Black Sea, which has been central to all of Russia’s recent wars; and it serves as a corridor for trade between Central Asia and Europe, especially in energy, notes Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. “I don’t even want to think of NATO without Turkey,” he says.

Especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Turkey also has no interest in surrendering the power of deterrence that nato membership offers. “I don’t believe it will ever happen,” says Tacan Ildem, Turkey’s former permanent representative to NATO. There is no credible alternative, he says. Turkey will probably remain a headache for the alliance, even when Mr Erdogan is out of the picture. But it is a headache nato will have to live with.

#### Iceland can’t.

Nato 49 [Nato, 4-1-1949, "Iceland and NATO", NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\_162083.htm, DOA: 7-4-2022 //ArchanSen]

Iceland, unique among NATO Allies, does not have a military. Icelanders have long been proud of their country’s pacifist tradition, which goes back further than its independence from Denmark in 1944. So the decision to join the Alliance as a founding member in 1949 was controversial. Throughout the Cold War, Iceland had several national debates about whether or not to withdraw from NATO. But despite this internal ambivalence, Iceland has continuously contributed as a valuable member of NATO, based on shared values and unity, democracy and freedom. During the Cold War, Iceland allowed NATO Allies to station troops on its strategically critical island and volunteered the Icelandic Coast Guard to assist the Organization, activities that were pursued after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

## DAs

### 2AC---A2: Turkey Politics

#### Even if they don’t trust NATO, they still want to stay in.

The Economist 22 [The Economist, 06-16-2022, "Is Turkey more trouble to NATO than it is worth?", Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/16/is-turkey-more-trouble-to-nato-than-it-is-worth, DOA: 7-2-2022 //ArchanSen]

Turkey and the West will never see eye to eye on the issue, and Mr Erdogan’s antics, as well as his habit of suggesting that the West, and not Russia, is the biggest threat to his country, will only make matters worse. Already, 65% of Turks say they do not trust NATO, according to a recent survey, although 60% support membership of the alliance.